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Abstract
This article examines the Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for
New Teachers, a nationally prominent program that has recruited and
prepared $20,000 bonus recipients to teach after seven weeks' training at
the Massachusetts Institute for New Teachers (MINT). Although state
officials have trumpeted this initiative as a national model that other
states are copying, they announced in November 2002 that they were
radically changing it. The changes included halting the state's national
recruitment efforts and replacing the seven-week, fast-track training
program designed by the New Teacher Project with year-long programs
to be designed by three of the state's education schools. Even though the
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state spent more than $50,000 recruiting individuals from states outside
the Northeast over the first four program years, it garnered just seven
bonus recipients from the non-Northeast states its recruiters visited, only
four of whom were still teaching in Fall 2002. The state did, however,
generate a substantial number of applicants in each program year
(ranging from 783 to nearly 950), most of whom came from
Massachusetts or nearby states. Contrary to state officials' claims,
though, it appears that many of these individuals had substantial prior
educational experience. Although officials stated that all bonus teachers
would go to 13 designated high-need urban districts, the state has never
met this commitment, sending fewer bonus teachers to these districts in
each of the first three years of the program. The state has lost a high
percentage of its bonus teachers to attrition particularly in
state-designated, high-need districts. These attrition rates are
substantially higher than comparable national rates. Although the state
has portrayed the Bonus and MINT programs, combined, as highly
successful, officials exaggerated many of the purported positive
outcomes. On the positive side, independent survey data (Churchill et al.,
2002) indicated that principals rated MINT graduates' performance
favorably, when compared to traditionally-trained teachers. It is not
clear, though, whether such ratings varied either by a) the extent of the
teacher's prior educational experience or b) the nature of the teacher's
placement (urban vs. suburban). The Bonus Program has produced
relatively few urban teachers, relatively few minority teachers, and low
rates of teacher retention, even though this effort was modeled after
Teach for America and critical parts of it were designed and often
managed by the New Teacher Project—two organizations that the Bush
administration has praised for their ability to design and run programs of
this type. Policy makers are urged to resist calls to embrace rapid
certification, an approach that has produced, in Massachusetts, low
numbers of urban teachers and high numbers of exiting teachers, all at a
cost of more than four million dollars.
Improving teacher supply and quality is among the most important educational issues the
United States faces today as policy makers seek to hire, over the next ten years, both
more and better teachers than ever before (Zernike, 2000). In Massachusetts, state
officials have developed a number of initiatives to address this goal, the most notable
being the Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Teachers. This fast-track
alternative to traditional certification programs has garnered national attention for its
$20,000 bonuses to selected candidates, its cross-country recruiting campaign, its
intensive seven-week training provided by the Massachusetts Institute for New Teachers
(MINT), and its claims of success (School Board News, 2001).
But the Bonus Program has also generated significant controversy. In February 2001,
independent research suggested that the Bonus Program had failed to live up to policy
makers' promises. Twenty percent of its first cohort of bonus recipients left teaching
after one year, and less than half of its second cohort chose to teach where policy makers
said they would—in 13 state-designated, high-need school districts (Fowler, 2001).
The Massachusetts Commissioner of Education, David Driscoll, steadfastly defended the
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Bonus Program against the preceding criticisms, claiming that this initiative was "hugely
successful" (Setera, 2001).  In November 2002, however, Commissioner Driscoll
announced radical changes in the Bonus Program. Starting in March 2003, bonus
recipients will be both nominated and trained by three "innovative" year-long
post-baccalaureate teacher preparation programs (Massachusetts Department of
Education, 2002a). The state will continue to run the MINT program, but Bonus
recipients will not attend it.
With these changes, the Bonus Program silently dropped its cross-country recruiting
campaign, stopped participating in the MINT training program, terminated its
relationship with the New Teacher Project (the organization that designed and managed
many aspects of this initiative), and abandoned the 7-week, fast-track approach to
training bonus recipients. Massachusetts has now turned to the state's schools of
education, formerly portrayed by the state's policy makers as the source of poor teacher
quality, as the sole source of new teachers worthy of $20,000 bonuses.
Why did one of the first states to jump with both feet into fast-track certification pull one
foot out? According to Orin Gutlearner, who coordinates the Bonus and MINT
programs, this change represents "a better use of our resources" (Archer, 2002).
Commissioner Driscoll stated that “by making this change in our program … we will not
only be able to support our colleges and universities, but also be better equipped to truly
find the most qualified recipients for our signing bonus” (Massachusetts Department of
Education, 2002a).
The preceding statements fail to answer precisely why the state made radical changes to
its famed bonus program. The current paper investigates, however, factors that surely
influenced state policy makers' decision to radically alter this program. The data
discussed here were obtained from the Massachusetts Department of Education, either
through its web site or through a series of Freedom of Information requests submitted to
the Department between 1999 and 2002.
Two factors warrant scrutiny of the Bonus Program. First, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts has invested a substantial amount of money, more than $4 million, for
this initiative that policy makers have used, in part, as a template for recruiting and
training at least ten percent of the state's new teachers (Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 2001). It is critical to gather information that will allow Massachusetts
legislators and the public to assess the effectiveness of this major effort.
Second, the federal government is vigorously promoting fast-track alternative
certification programs that, like Massachusetts's Bonus Program, "recruit highly
qualified candidates who are interested in teaching but did not attend schools of
education and place them quickly into high-need schools, providing training, support
and mentoring … These programs should become models for the future, as states make
it less burdensome for exceptional candidates to find teaching positions in our nation's
schools" (U. S. Department of Education 2002, p. viii). Indeed, the federal government
is endorsing not just the fast-track approach implemented in Massachusetts, but the
organization that inspired this initiative, Teach for America, and its offshoot, the New
Teacher Project, that the Massachusetts Department of Education hired to plan and
implement central elements of the Bonus Program.
For the Bush administration, the fast-track approach to teacher preparation constitutes a
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"more promising model for the future" (U. S. Department of Education 2002, p. 2), a
model that, if adopted nationally, will lead to the production of both more and better
teachers and thereby make it possible for the United States to place highly qualified
teachers in all schools, particularly challenging urban schools. It is important to
investigate, therefore, what this approach has delivered to Massachusetts and,
concomitantly, what it promises to deliver to the country.
Background
The Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Teachers was introduced in the
summer of 1998 in the wake of the great uproar over the results of the first two
administrations of the Massachusetts Teacher Tests (now called the Massachusetts Tests
for Educator Licensure). Concerned both about the quality of the state's teaching force
and about looming shortages of teachers in particular content areas (such as math and
science), the legislature and then governor Paul Cellucci supported legislation that
established a $60 million endowment to improve teacher quality. The most prominent
feature of this legislation was a fast-track certification program that was initially called
Teach for Massachusetts (Massachusetts Department of Education, 1998) but was later
named the Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Teachers.
The stated aim of the Bonus Program is "to encourage high achieving candidates to enter
the profession who would otherwise not consider a career in teaching" (Massachusetts
General Laws, Chapter 15A, Section 19A). The form of encouragement the state offers
is a $20,000 bonus signing bonus, with $8,000 distributed in the first year and $4000 in
each of the following three years.
The Massachusetts Department of Education contracted with the New York-located
New Teacher Project, an offshoot of Teach for America, to design and oversee the
recruitment and selection of the first cohort of bonus teachers. The Department named
the recipients of the first round of bonuses in spring 1999 and trained 59 individuals in
an intensive seven-week summer training program at the Massachusetts Institute for
New Teachers (MINT). These individuals began teaching in Massachusetts public
schools in fall 1999.
In order to increase the number of MINT-trained teachers in the following years,  the
Department 1) increased the number of bonus recipients to over 100, 2) offered
scholarships (worth $2,250) to selected applicants who applied for but did not receive a
bonus, 3) encouraged school districts to sponsor individuals' MINT training, and 4)
allowed individuals to attend MINT at their own expense. The state has now recruited
and trained four cohorts of  bonus recipients (FY 1999-2002), as well as three cohorts of
scholarship recipients and other MINT graduates (FY 2000-2002).
Organizations that either advocate for or are involved in fast-track teacher certification
have lauded Massachusetts's Bonus Program. The Milken Foundation recognized it as a
model for other states to follow (Hayward, 2000).  The National Council on Teacher
Quality (2002) listed Massachusetts as a "place to watch" for its recruiting practices. The
New Teacher Project, which took the lead in conceptualizing and implementing all
aspects of the state's effort, listed its work with Massachusetts as the first of four project
highlights on its web page (New Teacher Project, 2002).
In February 2001, the  Massachusetts Commissioner of Education, David Driscoll,
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stated that many other states have followed the Massachusetts model: "The immense
influence of the potential of our new teacher recruitment program has influenced
California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, New York and other states to initiate similar
programs. We are encouraged by the fact that other states are copying what we are doing
and have judged that what we are doing is worth copying" (Massachusetts Department
of Education,  2001a).
But should other states copy the recruitment and training methods that Massachusetts
has employed in its Bonus and MINT programs? Did the Bonus Program merit the
praise it garnered? What factors influenced state officials to radically alter this program?
To answer these and other questions, I consider next the Bonus Program's record in a
number of crucial areas: recruitment, placement, attrition, and program effectiveness.
Recruitment
One element of the Bonus Program that garnered much national attention was its
recruiting campaign, particularly its cross-country recruitment efforts. Headlines
appeared across the country describing how Massachusetts was scouring the country,
looking for "the best and the brightest" to come teach in Massachusetts. Although a
number of articles indicated that this effort was highly successful (Ferdinand, 1999;
Magee, 1999), data obtained from the Massachusetts Department of Education indicate
that Massachusetts's efforts  to recruit bonus recipients from states outside the Northeast
(i.e., outside New England, New York, and Pennsylvania) have been ineffective. As
Table 1 indicates, through the first four years of the program (FY 1999-2002), the state
garnered just seven recruits from non-Northeast states, despite recruiting in five
non-Northeast states in 1999, seven in 2000, nine in 2001, and four in 2002—at a cost of
more than $50,000. Since three of these seven recruits have now stopped teaching,
Massachusetts has spent more than $12,000 just to recruit each of the four active bonus
teachers from these states.
Table 1
Cost of Bonus Teacher Recruitment in Non-Northeast States
Fiscal 
Year
Costs Number 
of states 
visited
Number 
of 
recruits
Number 
currently 
teaching
Cost per 
current 
teacherTravel Personnel (Note 1)
Total
1999 $7,571 $3,685 $11,256 5 3 1 $11,256
2000 $8,865 $4,656 $13,521 7 2 1 $13,521
2001 $14,513 $2,631 $17,144 9 2 2 $8,572
2002 $6,943 $1,240 $7,943 5 0 0 -
Total $37,892 $12,960 $50,852 21 7 4 $12,713
Ironically, as described in Table 2, between 1999 and 2002, Massachusetts actually
recruited more than twice as many bonus teachers from non-Northeast states where they
did not send recruiters than from states where they did (18 vs. 7).
Table 2
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Number of Bonus Recruits from Non-Northeast States
Fiscal Year Number of recruits from non-Northeast states where Massachusetts:
Sent recruiters Did not send recruiters
FY 1999 3 3
FY 2000 2 6
FY 2001 2 5
FY 2002 0 4
Total 7 18
Why did Massachusetts experience such difficulty with its out-of-state recruiting? One
probable factor, discussed in a prior study (Fowler, 2001), is that many of the areas
where Massachusetts sent recruiters are experiencing teacher shortages that are far more
severe than in Massachusetts. These states include Texas, California, and Florida.
Another factor may be that Massachusetts' recruiters frequently visited states where the
average starting salary, when adjusted for the cost of living, is substantially higher than
in Massachusetts. According to Education Week (2002), Massachusetts' average starting
teacher salary, adjusted for the cost of living, is  $26,565 and ranks 30th in the nation.
Over the last four years (1999-2002), the state's recruiters have frequently visited higher
paying states, including nine of the twelve top-paying states. New teachers in these nine
states can expect to earn, on average, from $2,662 to $6,120 more per year than new
teachers in Massachusetts.
Table 3 lists a) the states that Massachusetts's recruiters have visited, b) how Education
Week (2002) ranked each state's starting salary on a national scale (adjusted for the cost
of living), c) each state's average starting teacher salary, and d) the difference between
the average starting teacher in that state and in Massachusetts.
Table 3
States Where Massachusetts Recruited for Bonus Teachers (1998-2002).
      
State Rank(1-51)
Average
Starting
Salary*
Difference
from
Massachusetts
Georgia 2 $32,685 $6,120+
Texas 3 $31,568 $5,003+
Pennsylvania 5 $30,911 $4,346+
Michigan 6 $30,878 $4,313+
Illinois 7 $30,745 $4,180+
North Carolina 8 $30,529 $3,964+
Delaware 10 $30,113 $3,548+
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Indiana 11 $29,306 $2,741+
New York 12 $29,227 $2,662+
U.S. Average -- $27,989 $1,424+
Virginia 20 $27,383 $818+
Wisconsin 21 $27,339 $774+
Washington, DC 26 $26,896 $331+
Florida 28 $26,631 $66+
Massachusetts 30 $26,565 $ -------
New Jersey 31 $26,542 $23-
California 36 $26,225 $340-
Rhode Island 39 $25,843 $722-
Connecticut 41 $25,352 $1,213-
Ohio 43 $25,017 $1,548-
Maine 46 $24,007 $2,558-
New Hampshire 47 $23,337 $3,228-
*Average starting salary is adjusted for the cost of living (Education Week, 2000).
A third factor that surely hindered the Bonus Program's national recruiting effort is the
state's certification exam, the Massachusetts Tests for Educator Licensure (MTEL).
While most states offer the Praxis, an exam that is administered throughout the United
States, the MTEL is unique to Massachusetts. Therefore, when Bonus Program
recruitment began in 1999, candidates had to travel to Massachusetts to take (and pass)
the MTEL to be eligible to win a bonus.
State officials attempted to address this problem by offering the MTEL in seven cities
outside Massachusetts on one date in FY 2001 and on two dates in FY 2002. As Table 4
indicates, however, this strategy met with limited success. The Department canceled the
tests for three cities (Detroit, Houston and Miami) due to low enrollment. Tests were
given, however, on each of the scheduled dates in Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia,
and Washington, DC. In all, 205 individuals sat for the MTEL in four cities in the last
two program years (2001 and 2002).
Table 4
Number of Individuals Who Took the MTEL Outside Massachusetts.
Test site Number who took the MTEL on:
January 2001 December 2001 February 2002
Chicago 16 10 14
Detroit 0 (Canceled) 0 (Canceled) 0 (Canceled)
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Houston 0 (Canceled) 0 (Canceled) 0 (Canceled)
Los Angeles 11 21 22
Miami 0 (Canceled) 0 (Canceled) 0 (Canceled)
Philadelphia 24 18 20
Washington, DC 12 14 14
Total 63 72 70
Besides offering the MTEL in other states, the Department responded to its
disappointing national recruiting campaign by cutting back on out-of-state trips in 2002,
when they visited just four non-New England states (Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia,
and Wisconsin) and Washington, DC. The Department continued to exercise
questionable judgment, though, when deciding where to visit. Four of the preceding
areas, unlike Massachusetts, produce fewer teachers than they themselves require. For
example, North Carolina needs to hire 10,000 teachers, but expects to graduate just
2,200 from their education schools (Silberman, 2001); Virginia needs to hire 4,000 new
teachers, but expects to graduate just 3,500 (Turner, 2001).
Data from Georgia illustrates the questionable decision to recruit teachers from that
state. According to the Atlanta Journal Constitution, Georgia is desperate for teachers:
Georgia schools hired 12,000 teachers this year, and the projected annual
need is expected to reach nearly 20,000 by the end of the decade. The state's
colleges of education only graduated about 3,500 students last year. Most
hires come from out of state or are former teachers returning to the
profession. (Salzer, 2002)
Moreover, Georgia's average teacher starting salary of $32,685 (adjusted for the cost of
living) is $6,120 higher than in Massachusetts. Given this difference, an individual who
chooses to teach in Georgia would effectively earn, over the next four years, $ 4,500
more than a Massachusetts bonus recipient would earn. Moreover, he or she would be
able to enter the classroom more quickly in Georgia because that state's fast-track
certification program, TAPP (Teacher Alternative Preparation Program), requires four
weeks of training but Massachusetts' MINT requires seven.
Since Massachusetts's recruiters visited historically black colleges during their spring
2002 trips to Georgia, it appears that their aim was to recruit minority applicants.
Although this is a worthy goal, only four individuals attended the Department's two
recruiting sessions in Georgia (according to recruiters' notes I obtained from the
Department via a FOIA request), and no one from Georgia applied to the program in that
year (Churchill et al., 2002).
Despite the apparent failure of the state's national recruiting campaign, the state has
nevertheless generated a considerable number of applications in each of its four program
years: 783 individuals applied in 1999 (Massachusetts Department of Education, 1999a),
"nearly 950" in 2000 (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2000a), 905 in 2001, and
932 in 2002 (Churchill et al., 2002). Not surprisingly, given the preceding analysis, most
of the applications came from Massachusetts or neighboring states: specifically, in 2001
and 2002, 84% of applicants came from Massachusetts, and 93% came from New
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England or New York (Churchill et al., 2002).
With the recent changes to the program, though, the state has abandoned its bonus
teacher recruitment efforts. Henceforth, three "innovative" post-baccalaureate programs
will nominate candidates for the bonus and the state will make the final selection.
Placement
Although the state's initial set of  recruitment materials clearly stated that all bonus
recipients would teach in 13 high-need districts, (Note 2) Massachusetts has never met
this goal. 71% of the first of  bonus recipients cohort (FY 1999) were placed in these
districts and 48% of the second cohort (FY 2000). In the third  program year (FY 2001),
only 35% of the bonus recipients went to the high-need areas. Table 5 shows that, from
1999 to 2001, the percentage of bonus teachers in high-need districts has steadily
declined while the percentage in high-need districts has more than doubled.
Table 5
Initial Bonus Teacher Placement, Fiscal Years 1999-2001
Fiscal Year Number of bonus teachers Bonus teachers initially placed in:
High-need areas Non-high-need areas
Number Percent Number Percent
1999 59 42 71% 17 29%
2000 105 45 43% 60 57%
2001 105 37 35% 68 65%
When teacher attrition and migration are taken into account, 41% of all active bonus
recipients in the 2001-2002 academic year taught in the state's designated high-need
areas. This means, of course, that 59% of all active bonus recipients taught in
non-high-need areas.
Many of the bonus recipients have taught not just outside of the designated high-need
areas, but in the state's most wealthy and academically successful districts. In
2001-2002, 37 bonus recipients taught in school districts that scored in the top 50 of the
Boston Globe's (2001a, 2001b) rankings of districts according to their scores on the
2001 Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). More than half of
these bonus teachers, 21 in all, taught in nine elite districts that scored in the top ten of
the Globe's 2001 MCAS rankings. These districts are: Belmont (5 bonus recipients),
Concord-Carlisle (2), Lexington (3), Lincoln-Sudbury (1), Needham (1), Newton (5),
Wayland (2), Wellesley (1), and Weston (1). Two of these highly advantaged
communities, Belmont and Newton, had more bonus teachers together (10) than eleven
of  the communities that the state designated as high-need areas, i.e., Brockton (5),
Cambridge (4), Chelsea (7), Fall River (2), Holyoke (1), Lawrence (3), Lowell (6), Lynn
(6), New Bedford (2), Springfield (6), and Worcester (6).
Why did the promise of a bonus not result in the placement of teachers in high-need
districts? At least two factors are at work here. First, many bonus recipients are not
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interested in teaching in the state's high-need areas. According to notes I obtained from
the Department (via a FOIA request), a Boston principal informed a MINT evaluator
that, when he (the principal) asked for a list of (FY 2000) bonus recipients willing "to
teach in a urban school, the list was only about 1/3 of bonus recipients."
The second factor is the inconsistent nature of  the state's commitment to high-need
districts. When the media reported in February 2001 that many of the FY 2000 bonus
recipients were not teaching in the high-need districts, two top state officials offered
conflicting responses. When a television interviewer asked Commissioner Driscoll why
so many bonus recipients were not teaching in these districts (where he had said they
would teach at a spring 1999 press conference), Mr. Driscoll replied, "What I said is that
was our goal" (Setera, 2001). Deputy Commissioner of Education Alan Safran told the
Boston Globe, however, that the state did not have such a goal: "it is 'bizarre' to think
qualified teachers should teach only in 13 urban school districts" (Vaishnav, 2001, p.
B1). Later he told another reporter that "there are at least 50 districts that we would
consider high need" (Associated Press, 2001). Each of the preceding statements
contradicts, however, prior statements from the Department, (Note 3) rendering the
goals of the program ill-defined at best.
The Boston Herald reported in January 2002, however, that the state had reaffirmed its
previously denied commitment to sending bonus teachers to urban, high-need areas.
Orin Gutlearner, the Department's Director of Alternative Teacher Recruitment, stated
that the Bonus Program was now seeking "people with experience in urban communities
and a mindset to work where they are most needed" (Hayward, 2002). This intention was
reflected in the wording of  the state's (FY 2002) recruiting materials that were
subsequently on the Department's web site: "Priority will be given to candidates who are
committed to working in an under-resourced urban district (i.e., Boston, Brockton, Fall
River, Lowell, Springfield, and Worcester)" (Massachusetts Department of Education,
2002).
Problems remained, however, with the state's new-found commitment to high-need
schools districts. First, at the same time that the Department renewed its commitment to
high-need areas in the statement cited above, it dropped seven districts from its list of
such areas. Specifically, it dropped Cambridge, Chelsea, Framingham, Holyoke,
Lawrence, Lynn, and New Bedford. Although it is understandable that the state would
drop Framingham, a district with higher MCAS pass rates and lower poverty rates than
the other high-need districts, from this list, it is incomprehensible that it would no longer
designate Lawrence and Holyoke as such. In these two districts, which are dead last on
the Boston Globe's MCAS rankings (Boston Globe, 2001a), 61% of  10th graders failed
the math MCAS in 2001, and more than 65% of the students qualify for free or
reduced-price lunch. By contrast, Brockton, with fewer math failures (38%) and fewer
poor students (38%), while certainly deserving extra resources, does not have such
extreme needs. Nevertheless, Brockton was on the Department's new list of high-need
districts and Lawrence and Holyoke are not.
The second problem with the state's renewed  commitment to high-need districts is that
the new list of six such districts posted on the Department's web site in spring 2002 does
not match another list of nineteen such districts that the Department provided at the
same time to researchers it commissioned to evaluate the Bonus and MINT programs.
(Note 4) Indeed, between 1998 and 2002, state officials referred to four different sets of
high-need districts: 1) the thirteen districts named in the FY 1999 recruiting materials; 2)
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the 50 (unnamed) districts that then Associate Commissioner Alan Safran mentioned to
a reporter in February 2001; 3) the list of 19 districts that DOE officials provided to
Churchill et al. (2002); and 4) the six districts named in the FY 2002 recruiting
materials.
The third problem with the state's new (spring 2002) commitment to high-need districts
is that the state failed to fulfill this commitment. Fewer than half (40%) of the FY 2002
cohort of bonus recipients (N=43) began teaching in fall 2002 in the newly-designated
set of six high-need districts. (Note 5) And 12% of this, the fourth cohort of Bonus
recipients, are teaching in districts that scored in the top 50 on the 2001 MCAS.
Attrition
The bonus program has lost teachers at rates well above comparable national averages. I
describe next the attrition rates for each cohort of bonus recipients and then discuss these
findings as a whole.
First Cohort (FY 1999)
The first cohort of bonus recipients (N=59) began teaching fall 1999. In fall 2000, 20%
(12 of 59) of this cohort did not return to the classroom, an attrition rate that is more
than twice the national rate of 9% for first-year teachers (NCES, 1998). In the 13
high-need districts, the attrition rate was higher, with 31% (18 of 42) either stopping
teaching or migrating to non-high-need areas (Fowler, 2001).
In fall 2001, seven more bonus recipients did not return to teaching, raising the attrition
rate to 32% (19 of 59) after two years. Concurrently, 48% (20 of 42) of the first cohort
who were initially placed in the high-need areas stopped teaching in these areas. This
loss was even greater in particular districts. According to the Department's records, 91%
(10 of 11) of the first cohort of bonus recipients in Chelsea stopped teaching, or left to
teach elsewhere, after just two years.
After the third year, eight more members of  this cohort stopped teaching, raising this
group's attrition rate to 46% (27 of 59), more than twice the national 3-year attrition rate
of 20% (NCES). And attrition for this cohort's high-need teachers rose to 55% (23 of
42), a loss of more teachers in three years than the nation's cities lose in five years (i.e.,
50%) (Darling-Hammond & Schlan, 1996).
Second Cohort (FY 2000)
The second cohort of bonus recipients (N=105) began teaching in fall 2000. In fall 2001,
12% (13 of 105) of this group stopped teaching, with 18% (8 of 45) of those placed in
the high-need areas either exiting the profession or migrating to non-high-need districts.
In fall 2002, 16 more members of this cohort left teaching, raising their 2-year attrition
rate to 28% (29 of 105). Concurrently, five bonus recipients who had been teaching in
high-need districts did not return to these districts, bringing the 2-year attrition rate for
this group to 29% (13 of 45).
Third Cohort (FY 2001)
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The third cohort of bonus recipients (N=105) began teaching in fall 2001. In fall 2002,
17% (18 of 105) of this cohort stopped teaching. Of the 37 bonus teachers working in
high-need areas, 30% (11 of 37) did not return to teach in a high-need area.
Analysis
The preceding data, summarized in Table 6 below, indicates that each cohort of bonus
recipients has sustained attrition rates that are above—usually well above—comparable
national averages. While the United States loses 9% of new teachers after their first year
of teaching, each cohort of bonus teachers exceeded this rate. Indeed, the first cohort's
1-year attrition rate (20%) more than doubled the national rate (9%), and the third
cohort's first year losses (17%) came within one percentage point of doubling the
national rate as well. Although the second cohort's 1-year attrition rate (12%) was closer
to the national average, its 2-year rate (28%) exceeded the nation's 3-year rate (20%) by
eight percentage points.
Table 6
New Teacher Attrition Rates
Teaching Population Percentage of new teachers who left
after:
1 
year
2 
years
3 years 4 
years
5 years
Mass. Bonus 
Teachers
1st 
cohort
(FY 
1999)
All 20% 32% 46% - -
High-need 31% 48% 55% - -
2nd 
cohort
(FY 
2000)
All 12% 28% - - -
High-need 18% 28%    
3rd 
cohort
(FY 
2001)
All 17%     
High-need 29%  - - -
United States All *9%  **20%   
Urban areas only     ***50%
* (NCES, 1998); ** (Education Week, 2000); *** (Darling-Hammond & Schalan, 1996)
There is greater variation between the three cohorts' attrition rates for bonus teachers
placed in high-need districts. In the first cohort, attrition was high, with 31% leaving
after the first year, 48% after the second year, and 55% after the third. The second
cohort's attrition rate for such teachers was not as high, though, with 18%  leaving after
one year, although this rate climbed to 29% after two years. However, the third cohort's
1-year attrition rate for high-need teachers, 30%, nearly equaled the first cohort's 
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attrition rate for the same interval and exceeded the second cohort's 2-year attrition rate.
The attrition rates reported above are consistent with previous research which indicates
that teachers who emerge from abbreviated preparation programs leave teaching sooner
than those who emerge from longer preparation programs (Darling-Hammond, 2001).
Indeed, given this fact, it may that the Bonus Program's attrition rate might have been
even higher had all its participants been entirely new to teaching. Data obtained from the
Department indicate, however, that a surprisingly high number of individuals who
attended MINT had substantial prior educational experience. Specifically, 22% of MINT
2000 participants (more than 70% of them bonus recipients) indicated on a
Department-sponsored survey that they had "attended a teacher training program (as part
of their undergraduate or graduate education) before attending MINT." Another 5%
indicated that they had substantial prior teaching experience, ranging from one year's
teaching experience as a long-term substitute, to four years' experience teaching in both
and public and private schools. Consequently, 27% of the FY 2000 MINT participants
had substantial educational experience before attending MINT. It is possible, therefore,
that the bonus recipients who were truly new to teaching left the classroom at even
higher rates than reported above.
These high attrition rates entail, however, not just a loss of teachers, but a loss of
training and bonus money. The state has now spent $921,250 ($748,000 for bonuses
and   $173,250 for MINT scholarships) for the 74 bonus recipients who have left the
program. Ironically, Churchill et al. (2002) found that 76% of MINT graduates said they
would have entered MINT without a bonus, a finding that concurs with other research
(Liu, et al, 2000).
Program Effectiveness
One kind of evidence that Massachusetts officials offered in 2001 as proof of the Bonus
Program's effectiveness was the large number of working teachers who have graduated
from MINT. This number included not only Bonus recipients (62% of all MINT
graduates), but also scholarship recipients (23%-30%) (Note 6), and other MINT 
graduates as well. For example, Commissioner Driscoll stated in June 2001 that "over
the last three years, this program has put more than 450 teachers into classrooms. These
are highly talented professionals who wouldn't be in schools today, if not for this
initiative" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2001c).
If accurate, this would be an impressive contribution over three years. However, analysis
of Churchill et al.'s (2002) research indicates that the preceding statement inflates this
contribution in a number of ways. First, the state produced not 450, but 444 MINT
graduates between 1999 and 2001. Second, 44 of  those graduates were no longer
teaching in fall 2001. Third, the state was unable to confirm the teaching status of
another 79 graduates. Consequently, 123 (28%) of  MINT graduates had either stopped
teaching or the state was unable to confirm whether they are teaching. Thus, the state
may claim, at most, that 321 MINT graduates taught in the public schools in 2001-2002.
This would still be a substantial contribution if, as Commissioner Driscoll has claimed,
these individuals would not otherwise have entered the teaching profession. But this is
not the case. Churchill et al. (2002) found that, not all, but 61% of  MINT graduates say
they would not have entered the classroom without the fast-track approach. This further
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reduces the contribution of the MINT and Bonus programs to approximately 196
teachers who, to use Commissioner Driscoll's terms, "wouldn't be in schools today, if
not for this initiative"(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2001c).
The effectiveness of the Bonus Program should be judged, however, not by the number
of such teachers "in schools today," but by the number of such teachers in high-need
schools or school districts. Why? Because one of "the three major goals for the
MINT/Signing Bonus program [is to] …. address teacher shortages in high-need
schools" (Churchill et al., 2002, p. 6). The Bonus Program falls short in this area,
though, because Churchill et al. (2002) found that, during the 2001-2002 academic year,
just 34% of  MINT graduates were teaching in the 19 high-need districts that the
Department identified for these researchers, which means that approximately 67 of the
196 teachers mentioned above taught in such districts. Consequently, the Bonus and
MINT programs together have brought to state-designated high-need schools a small
number of individuals who would not otherwise have gone into teaching.
Another kind of evidence that policy makers have offered regarding program
effectiveness is principals' responses to survey questions about MINT graduates. For
example, when Commissioner Driscoll issued a statement defending the Bonus and
MINT programs in February 2001, he wrote that "90% of their principals want to hire
more" Bonus recipients and MINT graduates (Massachusetts Department of Education,
2001b). The preceding statement does not capture accurately, however, what principals
said. In the first MINT evaluation, the source of this statistic, the author wrote that "most
principals noted that hires are made following an interview process" (Massachusetts
Department of Education, 2000b, p. 9). This comment implies that principals were open
to hiring, but not necessarily actively seeking out, more MINT graduates. Findings by
Churchill et al. (2002) confirm this implication. When they asked principals how they
would consider hiring more  MINT graduates, 10.6% said they would consider them
"with preference;" 10.7% said "with reservations [9.4%] or not at all [1.3%];" and 79%
said "the same as everyone else." In other words, principals who have supervised Bonus
and MINT graduates are neither eager nor reluctant to hire more MINT graduates, rather
they are willing to consider them as they would other traditionally-trained teachers.
Finally, state officials have pointed to principals' comparatively favorable ratings of
MINT-trained versus traditionally-trained teachers. For example, they reported that
"71% of principals who were interviewed … rate their MINT graduate/Bonus
Recipient(s) as average (42%), above average (19%), or well above (10%) average
compared to all of the teachers at their school" (Massachusetts Department of Education,
2000c).
The source of the preceding statistic, the 2000 MINT and Bonus evaluation, lacks
credibility, in part because it failed to report either the number or percentage of
principals' unfavorable ratings for survey questions of this kind. In order to ascertain this
information, I requested all of the original survey data from the Department and
calculated the percentages for the statistic cited above. I found that the evaluator had 
calculated this statistic incorrectly: 64% (not 71%) of principals had rated bonus
teachers average or above. Further, when I weighted the principals' ratings by the
number of teachers they supervised, I found that 60% of  Bonus teachers were rated as
average or above. When these percentages are aggregated in the other direction, though,
the same percentage of teachers, 60%, were rated as average or below.
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Further doubt surrounds this evaluation because it wrongly implied that the attrition
rates of the first cohort of first-year teachers (FY 1999) was less than 15%, when it was
actually 20%. Moreover, its author was, at the time she wrote the evaluation, a contract
employee of the Department who went on national recruiting trips for the Bonus
Program and earned approximately $150,000, over three years, while working for this
and other related Department programs. This is not to say that the evaluator did not
strive to be objective, but it is to say that few would consider a contract employee whose
future employment depends on a) the continued existence of the programs which she is
simultaneously working for and evaluating, and b) the good will of her immediate
supervisors whose performance she is indirectly judging, to be independent. Indeed, it is
doubtful that the Department, which calls for school districts to produce "outside
evaluation reports" (Massachusetts Department of Education, 2000d, p. 2) as evidence of
effective performance, would consider an evaluation produced by such an employee to
be an "outside" evaluation.
Due to the factors cited above, the 2000 Bonus Program evaluation is not credible.
Fortunately, Churchill et al. (2002) have conducted an evaluation that is far more
credible. The authors of this Department-commissioned report a) are independent and b)
surveyed far more individuals (including MINT graduates, supervising principals and
trainers) than the author of the 2000 evaluation. Although it is not practical to
summarize the many findings of this wide-ranging report here, it is pertinent to note that
the authors also asked principals to compare MINT-trained and traditionally-trained
teachers. They found that "overall, the principals were very positive about the quality of
the MINT graduates" (Churchill et al., 2002, p. 15) when comparing MINT graduates'
with other traditionally-teachers in the following areas: a) content knowledge, b) ability
to employ effective instructional strategies, c) ability to work with students with special
needs, and d) classroom management skills.
It is not clear, though, whether, and to what extent (if any), these ratings varied
according to where graduates' taught (high-need vs. suburban districts). Absent such
details, it is not possible to say whether principals in high-need districts were more or
less satisfied with the performance of the MINT graduates they supervised, particularly
those with little or no prior educational experience.
It is pertinent to note, though, that this Department-commissioned evaluation questioned
whether the state's seven-week fast-track approach to teacher preparation was sufficient
for high-need, largely urban districts. The authors  recommend, among other items, that
that the state "consider whether MINT needs to be changed fundamentally if it is to meet
its current goal of serving high-need districts. The demands of urban teaching are such
that a Bonus and a seven-week summer session simply may not be sufficient to
adequately prepare significant numbers of high-quality teachers who will stay"
(Churchill et al., 2002, p. 39). They go on to suggest that a variety of one-year
apprenticeship type programs may be more suitable.
The ultimate comment on the Bonus Program's effectiveness, though, is not what the
state's policy makers have said about it but what they have done to it. Their recent
radical revision of this initiative is an implicit admission that the program suffered from
chronic problems. Although state officials have not specifically named these problems,
the current research has identified a number of issues that have beset this initiative since
its inception. As I discuss next, these problems raise doubts about federal policy makers'
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claims that fast-track certification programs will help the country produce more and
better teachers in the coming years.
Implications for State and National Policy
The US Department of Education is a strong proponent of fast-track certification
initiatives. It claims that if more such programs are adopted nationally, this will open up
a new, previously untapped pool of  teachers to the country and thereby deliver the
following five benefits to the nation's schools: 1) more teachers, 2) more urban teachers,
3) more minority teachers, 4) higher teacher retention rates, and 5) better teachers (U.S.
Department of Education, 2002). Since Massachusetts's Bonus and MINT programs
were a) designed in accordance with the principles and practices the federal government
is exhorting other states to adopt, and b) managed for the most part by an organization
(the new Teacher Project) that the Bush administration has lauded for its ability to
implement such initiatives (The White House, 2001a, 2001b, 2002), it is appropriate to
consider to what extent Massachusetts has realized each of these benefits.
More Teachers
Approximately 196 individuals, MINT graduates who would not have otherwise
gone into teaching, taught in Massachusetts's public schools in 2001-2002. This
provided a moderately positive boost to the state's supply of  teachers, comparable
to the number of working teachers that one of the state's mid-sized schools of
education would produce over a similar three-year period.
1.
More Urban Teachers
The first three cohorts of the Bonus Program produced approximately 67 working
teachers who would not otherwise have entered teaching and who taught in the
state's high-need school districts in 2001-2002. This represents a negligible
increase in the state's supply of urban teachers.
2.
More Minority Teachers
Department records (obtained via a FOIA request) indicate that 9% of the 2002
MINT trainees are minority. This is one percentage point lower than the 10% of
new teachers hired in Massachusetts in 1999 who were from minority groups
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2000e). Churchill et al. wrote of  the
Bonus Program's minority teacher recruitment, "there has been negligible success
recruiting minority candidates, to date" (2002, p. 37).
3.
Higher Teacher Retention Rates
According to the US Department of Education, "nationwide, about 85 percent of
teachers certified through alternate routes remain in the classroom five years later,
demonstrating that truncated training programs with highly qualified candidates
do not result in those same teachers leaving the profession early in their careers"
(2001, p. 16).
This has not occurred in Massachusetts, however, where only 54% of the first
cohort of bounus recipients remain after three years, 72% of the second cohort
4.
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after two years, and 71% of the third cohort after one year. These retention rates
were even lower in state-designated high-need districts, with 45% of the first
cohort remaining after three years, 72% of the second after two years, and 71% of
the third after one year.
Better Teachers
To date, the Bonus Program has not offered any objective, test-based evidence (of
the sort that the federal government and most state governments now require
schools to produce) to indicate that its teachers are raising children's academic
achievement. Massachusetts has produced, however, survey data which indicates
that principals rated MINT graduates' performance favorably, when compared to
traditionally-trained teachers. It is not clear, though, whether principals' ratings
varied either by a) the extent of the teacher's prior educational experience or b) the
nature of the teacher's placement (urban vs. suburban).  Nor is it clear whether
these ratings predict improved student performance.
5.
Conclusion
The Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for New Teachers has failed to produce in
Massachusetts the positive outcomes that federal policy makers promise such programs
will produce in the nation, even though this program was modeled after Teach for
America and critical parts of it were designed and often managed by the New Teacher
Project—two related organizations that the Bush administration has repeatedly and
effusively praised for their ability to both design and run programs of this type. This
does not necessarily mean, of course, that fast-track alternative certification will not
work, either in Massachusetts or elsewhere. It strongly implies, however, that simply
embracing the two core principles the federal government has endorsed for such
programs—1) recruit high-achieving candidates and 2) get them quickly into the
classroom (US Department of Education, 2002)—will fail to deliver the benefits the
Bush administration is promising.
Officials should respond to the current research by resisting calls to embrace rapid
certification. It would be unwise to devote extensive funding to an approach that has
produced, in Massachusetts, such low numbers of urban teachers and such high numbers
of exiting teachers, all at a cost of more than four million dollars.  Given the current
teacher shortages in many states, though, it is understandable that policy makers at all
levels of government are increasingly willing to experiment with alternative forms of
teacher preparation. It is critical, however, that when officials fund such initiatives, they
do so with a spirit of experimentation—and with the rigor, transparency, and objectivity
that characterize proper experimentation.
Policy makers must insist on ongoing and independent evaluations of any experimental
program, evaluations that track participants' characteristics, such as prior educational
experience, eventual teaching placements, retention rates, and more. Absent rigorous
collection and independent analysis of  such data, the public will not know whether such
initiatives are effective. Independent analysis of carefully collected data is critical if
other states are to avoid what happened in Massachusetts, where state officials have a)
offered inaccurate information regarding the number and characteristics of MINT
graduates working in schools, and b) issued an audit in 2000 that inflated the program's
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favorable statistics (principals' ratings) and underreported its unfavorable statistics (the
first-year attrition rate). This inaccurate information helped convince some that
Massachusetts is developing a model of teacher preparation for other states to follow.
When independent data are brought to bear on this program, however, this initiative
looks less like a model of teacher preparation worth copying and more like an expensive
quick-fix that has failed to solve a complex problem.
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Notes
To calculate these costs, I obtained, via a series of Freedom of Information
requests, all recruitment-related travel documents from the Department. To
calculate personnel costs, which the Department did not include in its recruiting
budget, I identified the employees who went on each trip and then used salary
schedules to estimate how much these individuals earned while recruiting.
1.
The Department's initial set of recruiting materials explicitly stated, in a
Question-and-Answer format, that bonus recipients would teach in thirteen
high-need urban districts: "Q: What are the possible placement sites? A: Boston,
Brockton, Cambridge, Chelsea, Fall River, Framingham, Holyoke, Lawrence,
Lowell, Lynn, New Bedford, Springfield, and Worcester" (Massachusetts
Department of Education, 1999b).
2.
Note 2 (above) contains the wording of the 1999 recruiting materials.
Commissioner Driscoll reaffirmed this commitment orally during a May 1999
press conference, when he announced the awarding of the first round of bonuses:
"We're working with the urban areas in Massachusetts where these recipients will
be placed." Later, he said, "We have commitments from all of the major urban
areas— Boston, Cambridge, Chelsea, Fall River, New Bedford, Holyoke,
Springfield, Lawrence, Lowell—so we have commitments from all of the schools
districts.  It's just a matter of matching them up" (Massachusetts Department of
Education, 1999c). 
Finally, the Massachusetts Board of Education' s1999 Annual Report says: "New
teachers begin their four-year commitment in the summer in an intensive,
seven-week teacher-training institute, and groups of four to five began teaching in
thirteen high needs Massachusetts public school districts in the fall of 1999"
(Massachusetts Department of Education, 1999a, p. 20).
3.
Churchill et al. (2002) reported that "The Department of Education has identified
nineteen districts as being high-need, based on overall number of students, percent
4.
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of students qualifying for free- or reduced-price lunch, and MCAS scores" (p. 26).
These districts are Boston, Brockton, Cambridge, Chelsea, Chicopee, Fall River,
Haverhill, Holyoke, Lawrence, Lowell, Lynn, New Bedford, Pittsfield, Revere,
Salem, Somerville, Springfield, Taunton, and Worcester.
Whereas the state sought to recruit 125 bonus teachers in 2000 and 2001, in 2002
they planned on recruiting no more than 50. The Boston Herald reported that, due
to the poor performance of the bonus program's endowment, much less money
was currently available to pay for bonuses (Hayward, 2002). At 43, the FY 2002
cohort of bonus teachers is the smallest cohort the Bonus program has placed in
schools to date.
5.
I report a range of scholarship recipients because the Department's records are
incomplete: officials are unsure of the award status of 39 of their MINT graduates.
That is, the Department did no know whether the state, the individual, or a school
district paid the $2,250 tuition for these individuals to attend MINT.
6.
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